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NOTES
Nature of Employer's Liability Under Workmen's
Compensation Acts
The flood of state Workmen's Compensation Acts which helped characterize the second decade of this century raised a large number of problems, and lent new importance to an old question of terminology. Today,
when general social legislation is achieving in this country an almost sudden
prominence, there may be additional value in reconsidering the essential
nature of the employer-employee relationship, as courts have been spurred
to view it by the necessity of passing on questions raised by the acts.
The initial doubt as to constitutionality was early raised and resolved.
Not long after the passage of the first of these acts, the United States Supreme Court held that even a compulsory compensation act might be constitutional under the "due process" clause. Holding such an act to be within
the police power of the states, the Court explicitly recognized that ". . .the

legislation under review does measurably limit the freedom of the employer
and the employee to agree respecting the terms of employment .. ., This
might be construed as an admission that compensation acts did represent an
2
the
abridgement of freedom to contract. But in Cudahy v. Parramore,
Court, in a definition of terms, implied that these laws had nothing to do
with freedom of contract, because they had nothing to do with contract.
Holding that the imposition of liability upon an employer for an injury
suffered by his employee on the way to work was not arbitrary, capricious
or unreasonable, the Court explained:
"Workmen's Compensation legislation rests upon the idea of status,
not upon that of implied contract; that is, upon the conception that the
injured workman is entitled to compensation for an injury sustained in
the service of an industry. . .The liability is based, not upon any act or
omission of the employer, but upon the existence of the relationship
"

which the employee bears to the employment ..

. ."

Thus in passing on questions involving the relation of private parties to
the State, the Supreme Court deemed it advisable to point out that Workmen's Compensation Acts did not necessarily represent an interference with
freedom of contract, since they rest "upon the idea of status, not upon that
of . . .contract."

Other courts meanwhile, dealing with other problems,

frequently found it helpful to say that liability under these Acts was essentially contractual in nature, the provisions of the statute being "read into"
the contract of employment. This purported distinction between "status"
and "contract" may be found in connection with almost any sort of holding,
and may or may not have a practical bearing on the result. It may be added
as mere reinforcement, where the essential portion of the decision is simply
i. justice Pitney, in N. Y. Central R. R. v. White, 243 U. S. i87, 2o6 (1917).

Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219 (1916), involved a similar holding.
2. 263 U. S. 418 (1923), opinion by Justice Sutherland.
3. Id. at 423.
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that the employer's liability is at any rate not based upon tort-as where the
Kansas court, having held the employer's liability not tortious in nature in
order to allow the employee to recover at common law against the tortfeasor,
added that the liability was contractual. 4 In this case as in others, statements as to the essentially contractual nature of the employer's obligation
are scarcely more than dicta; 5 the same result would follow were the status
theory applied. Indeed, there are instances in which two different courts
have reached very similar results, while one has spoken in terms of contract, the other in terms of status. In either case courts have refused, for
example,7 to disturb a commission's finding,6 or to release an employer from
liability.
But these differences in language have not always been attended by a
similarity of result. On the contrary, cases are frequent in which an opinion
as to whether the employer's liability under a compensation act is based on
"contract" or on "status" has clearly influenced, if it has not determined, a
decision. The Tennessee court, for example, in one case evaded the rule
that non-residents are not entitled to the benefit of an exemption statute 8
by an ingenious application of the contract theory.9 The statutory provision,' ° it was held, having become part of the contract of employment, the
compensation payment was "not something that the law directly gives her
(the beneficiary) or allows her to retain, as an exemption, but is something
that she takes under a contract." 11 Adherence to the status approach would,
of course, have emphasized the fact that the payments came to the employee
by operation of law, and the statute would have controlled.
Wherever a court is called on to apply a statute or a rule of law which
in its expression includes the word "contract", its choice of adjectives to
describe the employer's liability becomes significant. Thus where a wife
sued her husband as employer of their son under a compensation act, the
defense contended that "no statute provides that the wife may sue her hus4. Moeser v. Shunk, 116 Kan. 247, 226 Pac. 784 (1924).
5. Cf. Frasca v. City Coal Co., 97 Conn. 212, 116 Atl. x89 (1922) (upholding statutory
provision for lower compensation to non-resident dependents); Johnson v. Ismert-Hincke
Milling Co., 116 Kan. 73j, 229 Pac. 359 (1924) (interest allowed on overdue compensation
payments); Anderson-Berney Realty Co. v. Soria, 41 S. W. (2d) 279 (Tex. Civ. App. 1931)
(employee conclusively presumed to know employer was insured under the compensation act).
6. See Solomon v. Detroit United Ry., 221 Mich. 599, 602, 192 N. W. 568, 569 (1923)
(the act "rests upon contract") ; Moody v. Ind. Acc. Comm., 260 Pac. 967, 972 (Cal. 1927)
("The legislation rests upon the idea of status, not upon implied' contract, and- the substantive rights of the parties, and the liability of the employer for compensation arise from, and
are measured by, the definitions, embodied in the act rather than upon any agreement of the
parties.").
7. West Jersey Trust Co. v. Phila. & R. Ry., 88 N. J.L. 1O2, io3, 95 Atl. 753, 754 (1915)
("assent of the parties to a new contract, or quasi-contract") ; American Fuel Co. v. Ind.
Comm., 55 Utah 483, 489, 187 Pac. 633, 635 (1920) ("right to compensation arises out of the
relation").
8. Southern Ry. v. Rollins, 22 Ga. App. 393, 95 S. E. 1020 (1918) ; Churchill v. Miller, 9o
Wash. 694, 156 Pac. 851 (1916).
9. Poore v. Bowlin, 15o Tenn. 412, 265 S. W. 671 (1924).
io.TENN. CODE (1932) § 6869. "No claim for compensation under this chapter shall
be assignable, and all compensation and claims therefor shall be exempt from claims of creditors." The New York act also contains this common provision. N. Y. CoNs. LAws (Cahill,
193o) c. 66, § 33.
ii.Poore v. Bowlin, 15o Tenn. 412, 415, 265 S. W. 671 (1924). Thus, under this holding, employer A and employee B may by contract alter the legal relations between debtor C
and creditor D.
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band in tort actions or for any statutory liability." 12 The court, granting
that the married women's act permitted a wife to sue only in contract,'3
based its judgment for plaintiff on the ground that liability under its compensation act was contractual. In the recent case of Stitz v. Ryan,' 4 a claim
for compensation was held to lie within the contemplation of a non-claim
statute requiring presentation of "claims . . . arising upon contract." 1

On the other hand, such a claim, when presented in bankruptcy, has been
held to rest upon "status" (and therefore to be non-provable) ;16 and the
same statement often accompanies, perhaps determines, a court's decision
as to the applicability of a given compensation act to a given injury, where
conflict of laws is involved.
It is evident, then, that the distinction between status and contract as
the basis of an employer's liability under compensation acts is not merely
academic, but may significantly determine the legal effects attaching to certain situations. This fact should justify a brief consideration of the concepts of status and contract in general, and of the propriety of applying these
concepts to the relations under these acts.
"The entry of status necessarily involves the entry of the state, the enlargement of the sphere of governmental activities" 17 (italics added). The
term "status" generally denotes the complex of rights, liabilities, privileges,
which characterize the members of a given group, when many or most of
these legal relations are attached to the group by operation of law, and are
not alterable by the individual action of any of the members.1 8 One may
sometimes enter a status through the gate of contract; but having entered,
one is bound to accept the resulting legal relations which the state, by virtue of its asserted interest in the matter, attaches to that status. Marriage
is perhaps the most obvious example. 9
It is in this sense that the term is to be understood in Maine's rather
famous comment that "the movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a movement from Status to Contract." 20 This was a recognition
of the ebullient laissez faire doctrine which had done so much to dissolve the
hard and fast relationships of the feudal period, and which at the first pub12.

Keller v. Industrial Comm., 350 Ill. 390, 396, 183 N.

E. 237, 240 (1932),

U. OF PA. L. REV. 637.

(1933) 81

13. This is the rule in the majority of jurisdictions. See Hendrickson v. Hendrickson,
198 Ill. App. 442 (1916) (abstract only); Miller, Wat & Co. v. Mercer, 170 Iowa 166, I5O
N. W. 694 (915). But see Fitzpatrick v. Owens, 124 Ark. 167, 186 S. W. 832 (ii6).
14. 256 N. W. 173 (Minn. 1934), (1934) 83 U. OF PA. L. RaV. 28o. The insurer having
failed, the compensation claim was held barred against the distributees of the employer's
estate.
15. MINN. STAT. (Mason, 1927) § 8812.
I6. See cases cited infra, especially note 47.
17. Kennedy, From Contract to Status (1926) 4 N. Y. L. REV. 49, 52.
18. SALMOND, JURISPRUDENCE (7th ed. 1924) 268; Allen, Statis and Capacity (1930) 46
L. Q. REV. 277; Vinogradoff, Rights of Status in Modern Lau. (1923) 1 CAN. BAR. REV.
460, 469. This is not the only sense in which the term "status" is used, but it appears to be
the most important one. Allen defines the concept as "the condition o.f belonging to a particular class of persons to whom the law assigns certain peculiar legal capacities or incapacities or both." Op. cit. supra, 46 L. Q. REv. at 289. For other definitions see the works cited,
and also 2 AUSTiN, LcTRns ON JURISPRUDENcE (3d ed. 1869) 757; HoI.AND, JURisPRuDENCE (12th ed. 1917) 141-3; Cleveland, Statics in Common Law (1925) 38 HARv. L. REV.
1074.

ig. See Salvesen v. Adm'r of Austrian Property [1927] A. C. 641, 653.
LAw (Ist Am. ed. 1871) I65. Italics added.

20. MArMNE ANCIENT
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lication of Ancient Law (1861) was barely beginning to give way to newer
concepts of the state's social responsibility. Observers since Maine have
not failed to note that the process more recently has been reversing itself
with true Hegelian symmetry.21 These have pointed out that the r6le of
the sovereignty has lately been growing in importance. This time chiefly
by means of social legislation rather than by the enforcement of such concepts as villeinage or primogeniture, the state once more is imposing upon
the "free" relationships of person and person, a congeries of attendant rights
and liabilities.
And certainly in the newer progress from contract to status, as the
terms are employed by Maine and Pound, compensation acts have played a
not inconsiderable part. Even adopting the absurd though common view
that an employment contract is the result of uncompelled agreement between
two parties equally free to enter into no contract at all, it is evident that the
provisions of a compensation act are no part of that free contract. For, as
has been pointed out, 22 to say otherwise would involve, among other legal
inconsistencies, the assertion that parties may be perfectly free to enter into
a contract, yet not at all free to alter it.23 Moreover, compensation acts are
"read into" employment contracts which antedate the acts.2 4
It may seem that liability under the "elective" acts is more properly
termed contractual, since generally under this type of act either employer
or employee may choose to remain within the rules of the common law. 25
As for the employee, however, he is unlikely to avail himself of this permission to remain under the harsh common law doctrines. And the employer's
acceptance of an "elective" compensation act is doubtless encouraged by the
invariable presence, in this type of act, of a provision that nonsubscribing
employers shall lose the right to set up the common law defenses of contrib21. Vinogradoff, loc. cit. supra note 18; POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE COMMON LAW
(1921) 29-31; INTERPRETATIONS OF LEGAL HISTORY (1923) 6o: "The generalization of progress from status to contract, understood as a progress from limitations of freedom or liabilities existing or imposed independently of will toward a complete freedom of contract and
liability only for willed undertakings or culpable conduct, is refuted by the whole course of
development of the law . . . in the last generation ..
22. See Dwan, Worknwi's Compensation and the Conflict of Lqws (1927) I1 MINN. L.
REv. 329; Notes (1932) 42 YALE L. J. 115; (1933) IO N. Y. U. L. Q. REV. 518; (1934) 12
Nm. L. BULL. 275. It should be noted, however, that some elective acts expressly provide that
the legal relations imposed shall be interpreted as contractual in nature. BRADBURY, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAW (3d ed. 1917) 86-87.
23. Agreements to curtail or waive rights to compensation have been held void as against
public policy. Illinois Indemnity Exch. Co. v. Industrial Comm., 289 Ill. 233, 124 N. E. 665
(I919) ; West Jersey Trust Co. v. Phila. & R. Ry., 88 N. J. L. 3O2, 95 Atl. 753 (1915).
This is often provided by statute. E. g., MICH. Coiip. LAWS (1929) § 8436; N. Y. CoNs.
LAws (Cahill, 1930) c. 66, § 32; WASH. REv. STAT. ANN. (Remington, 1932) § 7685.
24. See North Alaska Salmon Co. v. Pillsbury, 174 Cal. I, 2, 162 Pac. 93 (I916): "If
the right to compensation rested upon contract, it would seem to follow that such right
would exist only in cases of employment under agreements made after the passage of the
statute. But it has never been supposed that any such limitation could be upheld." But cf.
Hopkins v. Matchless Metal Polishing Co., 99 Conn. 457, 460, 121 Atl. 828, 829 (Ig23).
25. Generally, acceptance of the act is presumed in the absence of notice to the contrary.
E. g., CONN. STAT. (1930) § 5227; IOWA CODE (1931) §§ 1363, 1380. Under the Texas Act,
the presumption runs the other way. ANN. CIV. STAT. (Vernon, 1926) art. 83o8, §§ 18a-2o.
The compulsory acts generally give the employer a choice of methods. E. g., N. Y. CoNs.
LAws (Cahill, 193o) c. 66, § 50 (insurance in state fund or privately, or employer may be
accepted as a self-insurer); UTAH REv. STAT. ANN. (1933) tit. 42, C. 1, §44 (like New
York act).
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utory negligence, assumption of risk, and negligence of a fellow-servant. 28
Yet most courts have held that such inducements do not amount to compulsion, and that the employer's liability under an elective act is therefore
contractual in nature.
It has often been said in criticism that the employer's liability under
these acts cannot accurately be called "contractual". If some descriptive
term is needed, "status" seems much more satisfactory. However, to say
that the latter term more aptly describes the legal relations involved, is not
necessarily to conclude that either term should be used at all. This may
be indicated by an examination of some of the case material in the two
fields in which these concepts have been most important-the fields of conflict of laws, and of the bankruptcy statute.
The problem involving conflict of laws which most commonly arises is
that presented when an employee who has been injured in state B sues for
compensation in state A, under the act of the latter. In such cases the distinction between theories of contract and of status is usually clearly marked.
Where an elective act is involved, and the contract of employment was made
within state A, the typical result has been to allow compensation under the
act of state A, in accordance with the principle that the lex loci contractus
should govern. 2 7 If in such a suit the employee had previously been granted
an award under the act of state B (in which he was injured) the contract
theory apparently affords its disciples no decisive answer. It has been held
that the act of the forum nonetheless applies; but the employer's insurer
was credited with the amount he had paid under the foreign judgment. 28 It
has also been held, on the other hand, that since the act of the forum (and
therefore the contract of employment there entered into) provided for waiver
by the employee of all other rights and remedies, 29 his proceeding under the
26. E. g., CONN. STAT. (1936) § 5224; WIs. STAT. (1931)' § 331.37. See Ocean Accident and Guarantee Corp. v. Industrial Comm., 32 Ariz. 275, 279, 257 Pac. 644, 645 (927),
opinion by Lockwood, J.: "Most of the Workmen's Compensation Acts of the second decade
of this century show on their face an attempt to introduce a radical extension of the principle that the state may regulate the conditions of industry as it will in the interests of the
public, under language which preserved the form of freedomi of contract, while denying it
in effect. Many, if not most, of the statutes which insisted they were entirely optional in
character gave no more real choice than does the highwayman who presents a pistol at the
head of his victim with the 'choice' of 'your money or your life'. And many a court has,
following the form, based its construction of these acts on the theory that they were essentially a part of a contract between the employer and employee, and from this premise, true
in form, but false in substance, have flowed many results logical enough had the premise
been true, but utterly false when the true theory qf the laws is considered." The reason for
the optional form was doubtless the fear that a frankly compulsory act might be held unconstitutional.
27. Kennerson v. Thames Towboat Co., 89 Conn. 367, 94 AtI. 372 (1915); Pierce v.
Bekins Van & Storage Co., x85 Iowa 1346, 172 N. W. x91 (1919) ; Crane v. Leonard, Crossette & Riley, 214 Mich. 218, 183 N. W. 2o4 (192i) ; State ex rel. Chambers v. District Ct.,
139 Minn. 205, 66 N. W. i85 (i918) ; Rounsaville v. Central R. R., 87 N. J. L. 371, 94 AtI.
392 (1915) ; Post v. Burger & Gohlke, 216 N. Y. 544, 111 N. E. 351 (1916) (compulsory statute) ; Jenkins v. Hogan, 177 App. Div. 36, 163 N. Y. Supp. 707 (3d Dep't, 917) ; Grinnell v.
Wilkinson, 39 R. I. 447, 98 Atl. io3 (i916) ; Gooding v. Ott, 7" W. Va. 487, 87 S. E. 862
(iqx6).
28. Gilbert v. Des Lauriers Column Mould Co., i8o App. Div. 59, 167 N. Y. Supp. 274
(3d Dep't, 1917). "It is doubtful if the New Jersey Commission ever had any jurisdiction
of the case; it was one arising under the statute of this state and the contract growing out of
such statute." Id. at 6o, 167 N. Y. Supp. at 275. To the same effect is Jenkins v. Hogan, 177
App. Div. 36, 163 N. Y. Supp. 7o7 (3d Dep't, 1917).
29. This is a common provision, but is generally construed to refer only to common law
rights and remedies within the state-not, as here, to rights under the act of another state.
See cases cited note 23, mupra.
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foreign act amounted to "a clear renunciation or disaffirmance of the contract"; an award was therefore denied.3 0
The status theory also permits recovery in some cases for an injury
occurring outside the jurisdiction-but on a different basis. The criterion
was clearly enunciated by the New York Court of Appeals in Cameron v.
Ellis Construction Co.:
"The statute imposes upon every employer, foreign or domestic, the
duty to secure to his workman compensation for injuries, wherever
sustained, arising out of and in the course of employment located
here . . . The test in all cases is the place where the employment is
located." 31 (italics added.)
32
Other states have sometimes proceeded on the same principle.
The precise principles behind some of the more recent decisions, however, are not always easily determined. The distinctions between the theories
of status and contract appear in some instances to be blurring and blending.
A Colorado case, for example, apparently combines the requirements of
status and of contract, the court pointing out that it has allowed compensation under the Colorado act for a foreign injury only where the contract
was made in Colorado, "and a substantial portion of the services thereunder
were to be, and were, performed in this state." 33 Other courts, while adhering to the device of "reading" the statute into the contract of employment,
have held that the contract embodies the act of the place of performance
rather than that of the place of hiring-thus achieving a result scarcely to
on the basis of facts and holding, from the effects of the
be distinguished,
34
status theory.
It is to be expected that as courts are confronted with more embarrassing and complicated fact-situations, pressing for finer distinctions, a simple
30. Tidwell v. Chattanooga Boiler & Tank Co., 163 Tenn. 42o, 424, 43 S. W. (2d) 221,
223 (1931). The Tennessee Act provides for compensation in all cases where the contract
was made within the state, even though the injury occurred outside. TErNN. CODE ANN.
(Michie, 1932) § 6870.
There remains some doubt as to
31. 252 N. Y. 394, 397, 169 N. E. 622, 623 (193o).
whether "employment within the state" refers primarily to the location of the employee's
services, or of the employer's chief center of operations. The former would seem to be the
more relevant criterion, and has apparently been followed. Cameron v. Ellis Const. Co.,
supra (no recovery) ; Smith v. Heine Safety Boiler Co., 224 N. Y. 9, 11g N. E. 878 (1918)
(no recovery) ; Perlis v. Lederer, 189 App. Div. 425, 426, 430, 178 N. Y. Supp. 449 (3d
Dep't 1919) (no recovery) : "There is no doubt that a contract made within the state of
New York for services to be performed wholly in a sister state is without the police power
of the state of New York, and does not give a right to compensation under our Workmen's
Compensation Law." But cf. Donohue v. Robertson, 2o5 App. Div. 176, 199 N. Y. Supp.
470 (3d Dep't, 1923) (remitted for consideration) ; Smith v. Aerovane Utilities Corp., 259
N. Y. 126, 181 N. E. 72 (1933) (recovery), dissenting opinion of Lehman, J., at 131, 181
N. E. at 74, (1933) 27 ILL. L. REv. 571.
32. Durrett v. Eicher-Woodland Lumber Co., 1g La. App. 494, 140 So. 867 (1932) (no
recovery) ; Penwell v. Anderson, 125 Neb. 449, 250 N. W. 665 (1933) (recovery) ; but
cf. McGuire v. Phelan-Shirley Co., iii Neb. 6og, 197 N. W. 615 (1924).
33. Home Ins. Co. v. Hepp, 91 Colo. 495, 15 P. (2d) 1082, 1083 (1932) (recovery).
The court's statement is borne out by Platt v. Reynolds, 86 Colo. 397, 282 Pac. 264 (1929)
(no recov(no recovery) ; Tripp v. Industrial Comm., 89 Colo. 512, 4 P. (2d) 917 (931)
ery).
34. Industrial Comm. v. Gardinio, ii Ohio St. 539, 164 N. E. 758 (1929) (no recovery) ; cf. Banks v. Howlett, 92 Conn. 368, lO2 Atl. 822 (1918), confized to its facts; Pettiti
v. Pardy Const. Co., iO3 Conn. 1O, 13o Atl. 70 (1925), (1925) 35 YALP L. J. ii8.
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contract theory tends to achieve less satisfactory results. When it becomes
apparent that a shift to a new theory is desirable, the typical procedure is to
discover that, regardless of the doctrines enunciated in earlier cases, those
decisions may be explained on the basis of the new theory as well. The
New York Court of Appeals proceeded in this fashion, when in Smith v.
Heine Co. the Court undertook to switch from the contract to the status
theory.3 5 However, as an instance of wavering between various theories,
a line of Wisconsin cases is particularly illustrative.
In 1919, in the case of Anderson v. Miller Scrap Iron Co., the Wisconsin court held that its act applied to an employee injured in Michigan,
the contract of employment having been made in Wisconsin, both employer
and employee being Wisconsin residents. The services had been performed
partly in Wisconsin. 6 The court announced as the basis of its decision
the desire to "give every employee the remedy provided by the workmen's
compensation act under which his contract of employment was made." 37
Ten years later, in Wandersee v. Moskowitz, the court denied recovery to
an employee, resident in Minnesota, who had been injured in the latter
state.38 The contract had been made in Wisconsin, the services performed
in Minnesota and South Dakota. The court held that the plaintiff, not having performed services within the state, had never become an "employee"
with reference to the term as used in the Wisconsin act; 39 and added: "that
act never became a part of his contract of employment." 40 The following
year, in Val Blat2 Brewing Co. v. Industrial Commission, the court abandoned the language of contract- to state definitively:
"The one essential requisite to liability under the Wisconsin Compensation Act is employment under such circumstances as to create the
status of employer and employee under the Wisconsin Act. . . When
residents of the state contract for services to be performed outside the
state, a constructive status under the Wisconsin Compensation Act is
created, which continues until the employee acquires an actual status as
an employee in some other state." 41
The court's language clearly indicated that an employee could not recover
under the act of the state in which he was hired, if he had performed services wholly outside the state. Yet in the case under discussion, where precisely such a situation was involved, the case was remanded to the commission to learn whether the claimant was a resident of Wisconsin at the
35. 224 N. Y. 9,
ii, 1g N. E. 878 (1918), cited note 31, supra. Referring to the
(formerly leading) case of Post v. Burger & Gohlke, 216 N. Y. 544, 1I1N. E. 351 (1916),
cited note 27, sUpra, in which recovery had been granted presumably on the basis that the
contract of hire had been made in New York, the court noted that in the earlier case the
chief employment had also been within the state, the case thus being equally sustainable on
the status theory.
.
36. x69 Wis. lo6, 17o N. W. 275 (1919), rehearing denied, 169 Wis. 119, 171 N. W. 935
(1919).
37. Id. at 119, 17o N. W. at 279. The court noted at 113, 17o N. W. at 277, that "The
liability of the employer under the compensation act is not . . . contractual in the ordinary sense." But this comment refers to the fact that a subsequent act may be read into an
earlier contract. Cf. Zurich Ins. Co. v. Industrial Comm., 193 Wis. 32, 213 N. W. 630 (1927)
(recovery on contractual theory).

38. 198 Wis. 345,

223

N. W. 837

(1929).

39. WIS. STAT. (Brossard, 1931) § 1O2.O7 (4).
40. 198 Wis. 345, 348, 223 N. W. 837, 838 (929).
41. 201 Wis. 474, 481, 230 N. W. 622, 625 (193o).
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time of contracting. Presumably the actual holding of the Val Blatz case was
that a combination of contract plus residence within the state was sufficient
to establish the status requisite for compensation.
Something akin to this was the Wisconsin court's own conclusion, after
summarizing the preceding cases, in Interstate Power Co. v. Industrial Commission:
".. . where the employer and the employee are residents of Wisconsin,

and the contract is made in Wisconsin, the provisions of the Wisconsin act become a part of the contract of employment (sic), and the
employee is entitled to the benefits of the act no matter where he performs the services and no matter where his injury in the course of his

employment is sustained."

41a

But two years later, in McKesson-Fuller-M1forrison Co. v. Industrial Cornmission, came the court's retort:
"It does not make any difference where the contract of employment
was made, neither does it make any difference whether the employee
was a resident of this state." 42
Compensation was allowed to an employee injured in Illinois, who lived in
Wisconsin and performed most of his services in that state and a neighboring one. The basis of the holding was apparently that "this court has insistently maintained the position that where the relation of employer and
employee exists in this state, and the employee, as incidental to his duties, is
sent beyond the borders of this state and there sustains an injury, he is
entitled to compensation under the laws of our state." 13
But if there is any one principle underlying these five cases, it would
seem less simple than that enunciated. For of the five factors which are
apparently of significance in such cases-situs of contract, services, and injury, and residences of workman and employer-not one is consistently
associated with the holdings. Nor does even any specific combination of these
factors appear to determine the result. Of Wisconsin, as of other status
states, it seems impossible accurately to say more than that (where the act
is construed to allow of "extraterritorial" effect at all 44) courts have re41a. 203 Wis. 466, 472, 234 N. W. 889, 891 (ig3i). Here the injury occurred in
Wisconsin, the contract and chief services, as well as the employee's residence, being outside.

The second half of the sentence quoted is therefore dictum so far as injuries outside the state

are concerned.
Discussing the Val Blatz case,
42. 212 Wis. 507, 512, 250 N. W. 396, 398 (1933).
the court defended the fiction of "constructive status" on the practical ground that the employee, being a citizen of Wisconsin and without remedy under any other act, would otherwise "become a public charge in this state." 212 Wis. 507, 514, 25o N. W. 396, 398 (933).
43. 212 Wis. 507, 511, 25o N. W. 396, 398 (1933).
44. Some courts have interpreted the statutes of their states as inapplicable to foreign
injuries. E. g., North Alaska Salmon Co. v. Pillsbury, 174 Cal. 1,162 Pac. 93 (I916)
(status language) ; Union Bridge & Const. Co. v. Industrial Comm., 287 Ill. 396, 122 N. E.
6og (i919) (contract language) ; In re Gould, 215 Mass. 480, io2 N. E. 693 (913) ; Sheehan
Pipe Line Const. Co. v. Industrial Comm., I5I Okla. 272, 3 P. (2d) 199 (i93i) (status
language). In Massachusetts and California, the rule has been changed by amendments to
the acts. CAL. GEar. LAws (Deering, I93i) act 4749, § 58 (contract 'and workman's residence required within state) ; MAss. GEN.LAWS (1932) c. 152, § 26. Other acts provide that
their terms shall apply only to injuries within the state. E. g., PA. STAT. ANN. (Purdon,
x9i1) tit. 77, c. i, § i. For a summary of the provisions of each state on this subject, see i
SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION LAw (2d

ed.

1932)
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fused to compensate for an injury incurred outside, unless there existed
somec loser factual connection of the parties with the state than a mere
contract.
The difficulty of enunciating consistent general principles (if any here
exist) is increased by those cases in which compensation is sought under the
local act for an injury occurring within the forum, the contract having been
made outside. For this converse of the previous fact situation has not
always been followed by converse legal effects. Recovery has sometimes
been granted on theories of contract, 45 sometimes on theories of status; 4
and has sometimes been denied. 47 These cases, however, have chiefly involved concepts of "comity", "public policy", and the "full faith and credit"
clause; and have been discussed at length elsewhere. 48
In cases under the Bankruptcy Act, the determining factors are simpler
and more evident. While the concepts of status and contract may sometimes blend in the cases presenting conflicts of laws problems, the litigation surrounding provability in bankruptcy of compensation claims reveals
sharp, significant distinctions.
The question, as a practical matter, has become devoid of significance
since the recent amendments to the Bankruptcy Act, which squarely provide
for provability of compensation claims.4 9 But prior to this statutory solution, an interesfihg problem of interpretation had arisen and been adjudicated.
The provision giving rise to controversy allowed for provability of debts
"founded upon an open account, or upon a contract express or implied." 49a
After a careful discussion of this section, the court in Lane v. Industrial
Commissioner held that an employer's obligation to pay compensation to an
injured employee under the New York act "does not give rise to a claim
for debts as used in the Bankruptcy Act." 50 Citing a line of New York
cases which had determined that an employee could recover for a foreign
injury only on the basis of status, 51 the court concluded that an employee's
claim for compensation was not provable under the section cited of the
Bankruptcy Act.
45. Douthwright v. Champlin, 91 Conn. 524, IOO Atl. 97 (1917) ; Hagenbeck & Great
Wallace Show Co. v. Randall, 75 Ind. App. 417, 126 N. E. 501 (I92o) ; American Radiator
Co. v. Rogge, 86 N. J. L. 436, 92 Atl. 85 (914). The acts of these states being "elective", the
employer is held to have "accepted" the act by sending an employee into the forum, without
giving notice of refusal to assume liability under the act. The provisions of the statute are
thus said to be "automatically incorporated" in the contract. And see Rounsaville v. Central
R. R., 87 N. J. L. 371, 374, 94 Atl. 392, 393 (915).
46. See Ocean Accident and Guarantee Co. v.'Industrial Comm., 32 Ariz. 275, 286, 257

Pac. 644, 648

(1927).

47. Hall v. Industrial Comm., 77 Colo. 338, 235 Pac. io73 (1925) ; Hopkins v. Matchless
Metal Polishing Co., 99 Conn. 457, 121 Atl. 828 (1923); Barnhart v. American Concrete
Steel Co., 227 N. Y. 531, 125 N. E. 675 (i92o).
48. Note (1932) 46 HARv. L. REV. 291; Dwan, Workmen's Compensation and the_ Conflict of Laws (1927) i 'MINN. L. REV. 329. The leading case on these subjects is now
Bradford Electric Light Co. v. Clapper, 286 U. S. 145 (1932), which compels the state of
injury to recognize the provisions of the act in'the state of hiring, where the chief employment and the employee's residence were also in the latter state. The decision therefore involves no necessary choice between theories of contract and of status.
49. 48 STAT. 923 (I934), II U. S. C. A. § 103 (a) (6) (ig34 Supp.).
49a. 30 STAT. 562 (1898), I1 U. S. C. A. § 1O3 (a) (4) (1927). Thiis provision is also
found in the amended act. 48 STAT. 923 (934), 11 U. S. C. A. § 1o3 (a) (4) (1934 Supp.).
50. 54 F. (2d) 338, 341 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931). To the same effect is In re Auerbach,
53 F. (2d) 482 (S. D. N. Y. 1931) order af9'd, 54 F. (2d) 338 (C. C. A. 2d, ig31).
51. See cases cited note 29, supra.
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The earlier New York cases, since they involved problems of a totally
different nature, need not have been regarded as controlling. In a sense,
the result appears capable of justification on its reasoning. An obligation
imposed by law, and not arising from the free agreement of the parties-in
short, an obligation founded upon status as that term has been definedhas been held neither provable nor dischargeable as a "debt" in bankruptcy,
in cases involving the marriage relation. 52 The weight of this analogy is
lessened somewhat, however, by considering a serious factual dissimilarity
in many of the cases. Since a parent or husband will still be available after
bankruptcy, the opportunity to realize in the future upon claims for support
of a bastard child, or for alimony, may be sufficiently attractive to compensate
for the rule against proving them in the bankruptcy proceedings. But with
the injured employee, bankruptcy of his employer may well extinguish all
chances of future recovery. In cases involving corporate employers, the
corporation may go out of existence entirely; in such a situation, the rule
against provability is a clear detriment to the employee. It is true, on the
other hand, that the increased facilities for reorganization of corporations
make it less probable that the employing corporation will, in future cases,
cease to exist. In these cases, as with individual employers, the continuing
possibility that the employee may sometime realize on his fill claim, makes
the rule no more onerous than in cases involving the marriage relation. In
either type of case, however, it is clear that an option to prove in bankruptcy
or to chance a full payment in the future, materially improves the creditor's
position, and the alteration in the federal act in favor of compensation
claims is a distinct boon to employees.
Nor has a claim based upon an award by the commission been considered provable as a judgment, 53 where the award is subject to revision by the
commissioner. 54 The claim has therefore been said to be barred by the
rule 55 that a claim for unliquidated damages founded solely upon tort is not
provable. 56 Yet in a great variety of situations courts have been pointing
out since the inception of compensation statutes what is surely sufficiently
evident-that the liability thereby imposed, having no
necessary relation to
57
negligence or fault, has no reference to a tort claim.
The few courts which have passed on the nature of the employer's
obligation in relation to the bankruptcy statute, 58 having passed the legal
52. In. re Cotton, 6 Fed. Cas. 617, No. 3,269 (1843)
(payments for maintenance of bastard child) ; see Audubon v. Schufeldt, 181 U. S. 575, 577 (19oI) (alimony) : the obligation
"is not founded on contract, express or implied, but on the natural and legal duty of the husband to support the wife."
53. Under 30 STAT. 562 (1898), ii U. S. C. A. § io3 (a) (I) (1927). The provision is
unchanged by the amendments.
54. See Lane v. Commissioner, 54 F. (2d) 338, 342 (C. C. A. 2d, 1931) ; In re Auerbach,
53 F. (2d) 482, 485 (S. D. N. Y. I93I), both cited note 5o, supra. N. Y. CoNs. LAws (Cahill,

193o) c. 66, §§ 22, 123.

55. In re N. Y. Tunnel Co., 159 Fed. 688 (C. C. A. 2d, 19o8); Schall v. Camors, 251
U. S. 239 (1920).

56. See it re Auerbach, 53 F. (2d) 482, 485 (S. D. N. Y. 1931). "The claims sound in
tort, and tort claims are not provable under the Bankruptcy Act."
57. Moeser v. Shunk, 116 Kan. 247, 226 Pac. 784 (924), cited note 4, supra; see American Ice Co. v. Fitzhugh, 128 Md. 382, 392, 97 Atl. 999, 1002 (1916) ; Winfield v. N. Y. Cent.
R. R., 168 App. Div. 351, 352, 153 N. Y. Supp. 499, 500 (3d Dep't, 1915).
58. The sparsity of cases on this subject is probably due to the fact that the employee,
upon the employer's insolvency, generally proceeds directly against the insurer. Illinois Indemnity Exch. v. Industrial Comm., 289 Ill. 233, 124 N. E. 665 (1919) ; Fidelity & Casualty
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judgment that it does not arise out of contract, have sometimes added the
economic one that it has no relation to wages, and is therefore not provable
as such. 9 Yet economists have sometimes come to a contrary conclusion.6 0 The opinion of the New York court apparently was that the cost
of compensation is borne solely by the consumer. 61 But whatever may be
the case, an injured workman is scarcely less dependent upon compensation
payments than a sound one is upon wages; and a Congress which granted
may well have intended the same
priority to the latter type of payments
62
priority to apply to the former.
The employee's claim has been granted priority as one of the class of
"debts owing to any person who by the laws of the States . . .is entitled
to priority", 63 where the state compensation act provided that a right of

compensation should have the same status as a claim for wages. 6 4 But a
New York District Court notes that the clause applies only to "debts" within
the meaning of the Act-therefore not to an award under a compensation
statute. 65
Priority under this clause, however, has regularly been allowed to the
claims for unpaid premiums by private insurers of the employer, 66 and sometimes to claims by the state for premiums due a state insurance fund. 67 In
Co. v. House, 19, S. W. 155 (Tex. Civ. App. igi6). Often the employee receive payments
ab initio from the insurer: Collins v. Murray, 164 Tenn. 580, 5i S. W. (2d) 834 (1932) ; or
from a state insurance fund. 2 SCHNEIDER, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATiON LANW (2d ed. 1932)
c. X, especially p. 1542.
59. Claims for "wages . . . earned within three months before the date of the commencement of proceedings" have been .held entitle d to priority under 30 STAT. 563 (1898), I
U. S. C. A. § 104 (b) (4) (1927). This section is repeated in substance in 44 STAT. 666
(1926), 11 U. S. C. A. io4 (b) (5) (i934 Supp.). See Lane v. Industrial Comm'r, 54 F.
(2d) 338, 340 (C. C. A. 2d, I93i), cited note 50, supra; cf. Interstate Tel. & Tel. Co. v. PubI.
Service Elec. Co., 86 N. J. L. 26, 28, 9o Atl. io62, io63 (914), where the court, in,denying the employer's claim to be subrogated to the employee's rights against a third party tortfeasor, distinguished the case from an action for loss of services, saying: "The right to the
statutory compensation is a part of the compensation of the employee for services rendered,
for which the employer receives a quid pro quo." Tjhis is of course strictly consistent with
the contract theory.
6o. See 2 TAussiG, PRINCLES OF EcooioIcs (3d ed. 1923) 356: "The insurance
charges will ultimately come out of the workmen's own earnings."
6I. That economic laws should thus adapt themselves is at any rate stated as "the intention of the Legislature". See Post v. Burger & Gohlke, 216 N. Y. 544, 554, iii N. E. 351, 353
(igi6) ; American Fuel Co. v. Industrial Comm., 55 Utah 483, 489, I87 Pac. 633, 635 (I92o).
62. See Lane v. Industrial Comm'r, 54 F. (2d) 338, 341 (C. C. A. 2d, I93i) ; It re
Auerbach, 53 F. (2d) 482, 484 (S. D. N. Y. 193): "It must be conceded that Congress in
i898 . . . did not have in mind the legislation . . . which some fifteen years later found
expression in Workmen's Compensation Act." Conceding this, it is difficult to see why this
fact should of necessity bar the claims.
The provision is un63. 30 STAT. 563 (1898), II U. S. C. A. § IO4 (b) (5) (927).
changed by the amendments.
64. Brzinsky v. Acme Body Co., 37 N. J. L. J.183 (D. N. J. 1914) ; N. J.ComP. STAT.
(925) § 235, subsec. 25. Such provisions are not uncommon. OKLA. STAT. (Eagin & Eaton,
193) § 13373; WIs. STAT. (Brossard, i93i) § 102.28, subsec. i.
65. Matter of Rockaway Soda Water Co., 36 Am. B. R. 64o, 646 (E. D. N. Y. i9i6).
"In order that such a debt may be recognized in the bankruptcy proceedings, it would of
necessity have to be of such a character as to come within one of the provisions of § 63."
66. In re Inglis Mfg. Co., 292 Fed. 9o7 (E. D. Wis. 1923) ; see It re Deason & Co., i9
F. (2d) 275, 277 (C. C. A. 7th, 1927) ; In re Unit Lock Co., 4q F. (2d) 313, 316 (N. D.
Okla. I93i) ; cf. In re Inland Dredging Corp., 6i F. (2d) 765 (C. C. A. 2d, 1932).
67. In re Ireland, 4 F. (2d) 813 (S.D. Cal. 1925) ; cf. In re Syer, 8 Can. Bankr. Rep.
275 (Ont. 1927). Contra: In re Pick Co., 9 F. (2d) 207 (D. Ore. I925), on the ground that
the Industrial Commission, being "a mere bureau or agency of the state", is not a "person"
within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act.
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any event, the state's claims for assessments or premiums have regularly
been allowed as a general claim. 6 Into none of these cases does the question of "status" appear to have entered; yet the employer's obligation to the
state insurance commissioner would seem to be as little related to free agreement as his obligation to the employee. The bases of the decisions involving claims in bankruptcy are apparently no more clear than they were in
some of the other cases discussed; the confusion has simply received less
illustration.
More consistently satisfactory results might have been achieved had
attention always been directed to the practical problems as carefully as to the
legalistic ones. Since the intention of the legislatures which passed the compensation acts was obviously to provide protection to an injured worker or
his dependents, courts should interpret the acts, it is reasonable to suppose,
with the same end in view.6 9 This they have in general tended to do; though
the few cases construing the Bankruptcy Act indicate a distinct-and, it
has been suggested, unreasonable--exception.
The distinction between "status" and "contract", which was made in
almost all the cases discussed, appears rather to presage than to determine
decisions. Doubtless the employer-employee relationship under these acts
bears more resemblance to the usual connotations of the former term than
to those of the latter; and it is clarifying, when dealing with the relation
70
of the employer to the state, to speak of his position as based upon status.
But in construing a statute, where the relations involved are chiefly those
between the parties, use of the term may lead to defeating the legislative
intent; the law-making body may have used the word "contract" to denote
employer-employee relationships among others-in which case, it would be
well for the judicial body to adopt a similar terminology. As for the application of a given act to fact-situations involving other states, the so-called
status theory seems on the whole to achieve the more desirable results. It
is the more reasonable, in that it tends to extend the jurisdiction of the state
concomitantly with its police power; and it is less likely to demand the absence of either party from his domicile. 71 It has appeared, however, that
some courts have been able to achieve these results by treating the relationship as contractual.
It is difficult to see, however, why either term should be considered an
essential element of decisions under compensation statutes. Such decisions
presumably are intended to construe and effect the intention of the legislature; there seems then no reason for attempting to secure the appearance
of conformance to doctrines of common law-which admittedly may be
abrogated by the statute. Even the inclusion, in a compensation act, of a
word like "contract" need not necessarily indicate a legislative intention that
68. Ii re Farrell, 211 Fed. 212 (W. D. Wash. 1914); In re Taylor Logging & Lumber
Co., 28 F. (2d) 526 (W. D. Wash. 1928) ; Matter of Eureka Paper Co., 44 Am. B. R. I7q
(N. D. N. Y. 1919).

69. The dogma is that doubts should be resolved in favor of the employee.
op. cit. supra note 58, at 2132.
70. Cudahy v. Parramore, 263 U. S. 418 (1923), cited sapra, note 2.

2 SCHNIDER,

71. The court in Ocean Accident Corp. v. Industrial Comm., 32 Ariz. 275, 285, 257 Pac.
644, 647 (1927) suggests in addition that a contractual state might allow a large employer to
gain at the expense of his workmen, by insisting on hiring in a state whose compensation act
is less liberal, though the work is to be performed elsewhere. But see cases cited notes 44-46

supra.
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all the legal incidents attaching to a formal contract should inhere in the relation created by statute.7 2 Courts might well take judicial notice of the fact
that not all lawmakers are accomplished jurists, or that even accomplished
jurists may fail to foresee all the possible implications inherent in one generic legal term. The attempt to reach practical results by way of legal categories consistently employed has frequently led a court into a dilemma of its
own contriving-a choice between legal absurdity for the sake3 of practical
result, or practical mischief for the sake of legal consistency7
Resolution of the dilemma may also come from the legislatures, which
may help by framing laws with more explicitness, and by employing more
liberally the process of amendment. One trusts the hope is not a vain one.
For the "movement from contract to status" is, if anything, gaining momentum. The relationship of enterprise and worker, in particular, is coming increasingly under the regulation of state and federal governments. In
applying such regulation, it is essential that courts shall not tangle themselves in categories; the interpretation in each instance- should, more than
it has in the past, be based on probable legislative intention and on the comparative desirability of the factual consequences which hinge on each decision.
B.G.
72. See BRADumY, loc. cit. supra note 22.
73. See cases cited supra, especially notes 8-11.

